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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WILMA R. BUGGER, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
CHARLES B. BUGGER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
: Case No. 940394-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
WILMA R. BUGGER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Comes now the Plaintiff/Appellee, Wilma R. Bugger, by and 
through her attorneys of record, W. Kevin Jackson and Douglas P. 
Hoyt, and respectfully submits the following appellate brief in 
this matter. 
II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2) (i) (1994) . This is an appeal 
by the Defendant from a Decree of Annulment (Entered Nunc Pro Tunc) 
entered by the Third District Court, Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
presiding, on or about the 3rd day of June, 1994. No post judgment 
motions were filed by either party. A notice of appeal was filed 
by the Defendant on or about the 30th day of June, 1994. The 
Plaintiff did not file a cross appeal. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following four (4) issues are presented to this Court by 
the Appellant Charles B. Bugger (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Defendant"): 
1. Did the Third District court err, as a matter of Law, in 
entering the June 3, 1994 Decree of Annulment, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law "Nunc Pro Tunc", and if so why? 
2. Did the Third District court err, as a matter of Law, in 
setting aside Appellant's Amended Decree of Annulment, entered on 
or about July 22, 1993? 
3. Did the Third District court err, as a factual finding, 
in concluding there was "good cause" for a Decree of Annulment to 
be entered Nunc Pro Tunc in this matter? 
4. Did the Third District court err, as a factual finding, 
in concluding that the Respondent (sic) did not intentionally and 
willfully disregard Judge Conder's ruling in the 1983 proceedings? 
5. The appeal also presents the issue of whether or not the 
ruling by the Third District Court can be sustained on alternative 
grounds? 
IV. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW QN APPEAL 
This court has defined the standard of review for an appeal 
from a decree of divorce. The standard of review that is used is 
as follows: The Court of Appeals will not disturb the findings of 
fact of the trial court unless a clear abuse of discretion is 
shown. Burnham v. Burnham. 716 P.2d 781 (Utah 1986), Greene v, 
Greene. 751 P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1988) cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 
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(Utah 1988) . The Appellate Court will therefore give great 
deference to the factual findings of the Trial Court. Cummings v. 
Cummings. 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991). 
Issues of law are reviewed by this Court under the correction 
of error standard with no special deference being given to the 
District Court! s rulings on the law. Smith v. Smith, 793 P. 2d 407 
(Utah App. 1990), Cummings. 821 P.2d at 476. 
V. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statute for purposes of this appeal is Utah 
Code Annotated Section 30-4a-l (1983). This section reads as 
follows: 
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of 
good cause and giving of such notice as may be ordered, 
enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to 
marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of 
marriage. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Nature of the Case: 
This appeal is made by reason of an action for an annulment of 
a marriage between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The Defendant 
filed the action for an annulment in the Third District Court, for 
Salt Lake County, on or about the 3rd day of August, 1982. 
B. The Course of Proceedings 
On or about the 23rd day of October, 1981 the Plaintiff, Wilma 
R. Bugger, filed a Verified Complaint for a divorce against the 
Defendant, Charles Bugger. The Defendant did not file an answer to 
the Complaint and on the 7th day of December, 1981 a default was 
taken against the Defendant. A Decree of Divorce was thereafter 
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entered on the 25th day of May, 1982 by the Honorable Raymond S. 
Uno. Notice of the entry of the Decree was then sent to the 
Defendants attorney of record, Horace J. Knowlton. 
On or about the 3rd day of August, 1982 the Defendant filed, 
with the clerk of the Third District Court, an Answer and 
Counterclaim. The Defendant's Counterclaim requested the Court to 
dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint and for the entry of a Decree of 
Annulment. A trial on the merits of the Defendant's Counterclaim 
was thereafter held before the Honorable Dean E. Conder on the 19th 
day of April, 1983. At the conclusion of the trial Judge Conder 
entered his findings of fact and conclusions of law and the final 
judgment for the disposition of the property the parties acquired 
during the course of the marriage. The judge's findings and 
conclusions and the judgment of the court were all made on the 
record, a copy of the transcript of said record is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "A". 
The Plaintiff's attorney of record, Kenn Hanson, then prepared 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of 
Annulment and submitted them to the Court for entry. It appears 
from the court's records that said findings and decree were never 
entered by the court or filed by the clerk of the court. Mr. 
Hanson prepared an affidavit stating that he prepared the findings 
and the decree and submitted them to the court for filing and 
entry. (R. 13 7-152) . A copy of Mr. Hanson's Affidavit is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "B". This affidavit contains as attachments the 
Decree of Annulment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
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Law, as exhibits to the affidavit, as Mr. Hanson prepared them for 
entry. The Plaintiff cannot determine that they were lost or 
misplaced by the clerk of the court. 
In any event, the Plaintiff and the Defendant then went about 
their separate lives for approximately ten (10) years. Neither 
party was aware that the Court's official record may have been 
deficient. During this period of time the parties acted as if the 
findings and the decree had been signed and duly entered by the 
court. The Defendant never tried to execute or enforce the Decree 
of Annulment entered by the Court until around the 19th day of 
April, 1993. The Defendant did nothing to compromise, settle or 
have the Plaintiff comply with the Decree for exactly ten (10) 
years. 
At this time the Defendant attempted to locate the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Annulment in the 
Court files. When he discovered that the documents were not in the 
file he prepared them himself and submitted them to the Court for 
the Court's signature. (R. 47 and 51). The Defendant then 
submitted to the court amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and an amended Decree of Divorce. (R. 57 and 61). The Trial 
Court, Judge Tyrone Medley now presiding, entered the Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Amended Decree of 
Annulment on or about the 22nd day of July, 1993. The Defendant 
never gave the Plaintiff any notice of the submission of these new 
or amended documents to the court and the subsequent entry of by 
the court, as is evidenced by the lack of any type of certificate 
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of delivery attached to these pleadings. During the time that the 
Defendant was preparing and submitting these amended pleadings the 
Plaintiff was not a resident of the State of Utah and could not 
have known that the documents were being submitted to the court. 
She was serving a mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints in New York State. It was only on the Plaintiff !s 
return to the State of Utah that she learned the Defendant was 
trying to execute on the judgment that was now over ten years old. 
The Defendant next sought the issuance of an Order to Show 
Cause in the Trial Court. The Plaintiff responded with a 
counterclaim against the Defendantf s Order to Show Cause claiming 
offsets for amounts the Plaintiff paid towards debts Judge Conder 
ordered the Defendant to pay under the Decree of Annulment. A 
hearing on the Defendant's Order to Show Cause and the Plaintiff's 
counterclaim was held on the 19th day of April, 1994. The issue 
presented to the District Court by the Defendant pursuant to the 
Order to Show Cause was why the Plaintiff had not paid the 
Defendant the sum of money the Defendant claims was awarded him by 
the Court at the time of the hearing held in 1983. At the hearing 
on the Order to Show Cause Judge Medley found that the Plaintiff 
had not been given proper or sufficient notice of the filing and 
the entry of the amended findings and decree. Judge Medley then 
set the amended findings and decree aside. The court then preceded 
to hear the Defendant's Order to Show Cause. 
At the conclusion of the hearing on the Order to Show Cause 
Judge Medley found that good cause existed for the entry of the 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of 
Annulment. This finding was based upon Judge Conder made the 
decisions on the items in question ten years prior to the hearing. 
Judge Medley found that the transcript of the 1983 trial "clearly 
bears this out." (R. 260-61). Judge Medley further found that 
both parties were barred from their respective claims by the 
equitable doctrine of Laches for failing to pursue these claims 
until ten (10) years after the court granted the annulment. (R. 
261) . 
The Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal and has timely 
filed a brief with this court. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. The Plaintiff was married to Dale L. Alexander. The 
parties were divorced on January 21, 1946. The divorce was to 
become absolute and final six (6) months after the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce. 
2. The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married on June 10, 
1946 in Las Vegas, Nevada. At the time of this marriage the 
Plaintifffs divorce had not yet become absolute. 
3. The Plaintiff sued the Defendant for a divorce on or 
about the 23rd day of October, 1981. (R. 2) 
4. The Defendant did not timely answer the Plaintiff's 
Complaint for a divorce and a default was taken against the 
Defendant on or about the 7th day of December, 1981. (R. 7) 
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5. On or about the 3rd day of August, 1982 the Defendant 
finally answered the Plaintiff's complaint and counterclaimed for 
an annulment of the marriage. (R. 24) 
6. On the 19th day of April, 1983 a trial was scheduled to 
be held before the Honorable Dean D. Conder. Judge Conder granted 
the Defendant's claim for an annulment and made a division of the 
joint assets held by the parties. At time of the trial Judge 
Conder considered the evidence presented to him as the basis for 
the property division. 
7. The Plaintiff's attorney, Kenn Hanson, prepared the 
original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of 
Annulment. (R. 137-152). He then presented the documents to the 
court for the court's signature and for filing of record by the 
clerk of the court. For an unknown reason the documents were never 
placed in the file along with the other pleadings in this case. 
8. After approximately ten (10) years later the Defendant 
attempted to enforce the Decree and to collect on the judgment. At 
no time prior to this date did the Defendant try to determine the 
contents of the court's file. (R. 74) 
9 . When the Defendant learned that the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Annulment were not in the 
court's file, he prepared and submitted a proposed Decree and 
proposed findings for the court's signature. (R. 74) 
10. After having obtained the judge's signature on the 
proposed decree and the proposed findings the Defendant prepared 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Amended 
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Decree of Annulment and had the court sign these documents. (R. 57-
63) . 
11. The Defendant never gave the Plaintiff any notice that he 
was submitting any of these pleadings to the clerk of the court for 
subsequent entry. None of these documents include a certificate of 
service. No certificate of service was file with the court. 
12. After entry of the amended Decree of Annulment the 
Defendant then brought an Order to Show Cause against the Plaintiff 
trying to enforce the Amended Decree of Annulment and seeking 
payment of the judgment in the sum of approximately $11,562.00. 
(R. 64) . 
13. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the 
Defendants Order to Show Cause on the 19th day of April, 1994. 
(R. 112). 
14. At the hearing Judge Medley set aside the Defendant's 
Amended Findings and Amended Decree of Annulment because the 
Plaintiff had not been given proper notice the Defendant had 
submitted the documents. (R. 183). 
15. Judge Medley also found that no Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law nor a Decree of Annulment were ever entered of 
record in the case. (R. 180). 
16. Judge Medley found, at the conclusion of the hearing, 
that the Plaintiff did not intentionally disregard the orders of 
the court as they were stated on the record by Judge Conder during 
the 1993 trail. (R. 261). 
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17. Judge Medley found that good cause existed for the entry 
of the Findings and Decree nunc pro tunc. The judge based the good 
cause on the fact that Judge Conder had made decisions on the 
record of the issues presented during the 1983 hearing. He made 
this finding based upon the transcript of the 1983 trial which was 
provided by the Defendant. (R. 260-261). 
18. Judge Medley was not persuaded that there was sufficient 
evidence presented that would sustain the Defendant's Order to Show 
Cause. The judge then struck the Order to Show Cause. (R. 262) . 
19. Judge Medley further found that both the Plaintiff and 
the Defendant were lacking in credibility as witnesses to varying 
degrees. (R. 262-263). 
20. Judge Medley found that both parties were barred from 
pursuing their respective claims by the legal doctrine of laches. 
(R. 261 and 263). 
21. With these findings by the Court, which were made on the 
record at the April 19, 1994 hearing, Judge Medley dismissed each 
party's claims against the other party. (R. 260-263) 
22. The Defendant then filed a Notice of Appeal and has filed 
his brief in the matter. (R. 162). 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court did not err in entering the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Annulment nunc pro 
tunc. "At common law, nunc pro tunc allowed a court to correct its 
earlier error or supply its omission so the record accurately 
reflected that which in fact had taken place." Bagshaw v. Bagshaw. 
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788 P.2d 1057 (Utah App. 1990). Plaintiff's former attorney of 
record had prepared the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
the Decree of Annulment and submitted the documents for entry, for 
an unknown reason the documents were never entered by the clerk or 
were lost after execution. Therefore, the Trial Court was not in 
error when it ordered the Findings and the Decree entered nunc pro 
tunc. 
2. The Trial Court did not err when it set aside the 
Defendant's Amended Decree of Annulment and the Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Plaintiff was not given notice of 
the entry of these documents by the Defendant when the Defendant 
presented the documents for entry. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
58A(d) requires a party to promptly give notice of the signing or 
entry of judgment to all other parties and to file proof of service 
of such notice with the court. The Defendant gave no such notice 
to the Plaintiff of the signing of the documents by Judge Medley 
nor did he file any proof of the giving of the notice with the 
clerk of the court. Judge Medley properly set aside the Decree for 
the Defendant's failure to follow the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
3. Judge Medley did not err when he found that there was 
good cause for entering the Decree of Annulment and the Findings of 
Fact nunc pro tunc. The Appeals Court will not reverse a Trial 
Court's determination of facts if the ruling is correctly based 
upon a proper ground. Peterson v. Peterson, 645 P. 2d 3 7 (Utah App. 
1991). In this case Judge Medley based his finding of good cause 
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on the fact that Judge Conder had made a judgment on the record at 
the 1983 trial on the merits. 
4. The Trial Court did not err in finding that the Plaintiff 
did not intentionally and willfully disregard Judge Conder's ruling 
in the 1983 trial. The judge at the trial level is better able to 
determine the credibility of a witness. The Court of Appeals 
should assume that the Trial Court believed the evidence which 
supports the findings. Stone v. Stone, 431 P.2d 802, 20 Utah 2d 
287 (1967) . Judge Medley found that the Plaintiff did not 
intentionally disregard the 1983 order. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court did not abuse its description 
when it entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
o£ Law and the Decree o£ Annulment 
nunc pro tunc. 
The Trial Court may "enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter 
relating to marriage . . . or annulment of marriage" upon the Court 
finding that good cause exists. See UCA §30-4a-l. This Court has 
stated that " ' good cause' must be determined on a case by case 
basis, in light of all of the surrounding circumstances, as equity 
and justice require." Home v. Home, 737 P. 2d 244 (Utah App. 
1987) . The Trial Court found the necessary good cause for entering 
the Decree and the Findings nunc pro tunc. Judge Medley 
specifically stated that he believed good cause existed "because 
Judge Conder actually made the decisions on these issues some ten 
years ago and I think the transcript clearly bears this out." (R. 
260-261). The affidavit of Mr. Hanson also substantiates the fact 
that the pleadings were prepared and actually submitted to the 
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Court. What happens thereafter to the pleadings is beyond the 
control of the Plaintiff. 
The finding of good cause by the Trial Court is specific and 
spells out what the facts are in the case which give rise to the 
entry of the Decree and the Findings nunc pro tunc. The Trial 
Court's factual finding needs to be given great deference by this 
court. The Utah Supreme Court states that they accord 
"considerable deference to findings and judgment of the trial court 
due to its advantageous position." Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 
1218 (Utah 1980) . 
Judge Medley was able to review the case at length, make 
factual findings based upon the evidence presented to the court, 
listen to testimony by both parties and to make a determination 
about the credibility of the parties during and at the conclusion 
of the 1994 hearing. His determination was that good cause existed 
to allow him to enter the Decree and the Findings nunc pro tunc. 
This Court should give this decision the same deference to this 
finding. 
The Defendant argues in his brief that the facts are not 
sufficient to support Judge Medley1s decision. This argument 
cannot be upheld in light of the evidence of the case. The 
Defendant argues that it was the Plaintiff's responsibility to 
prepare the original Decree of Annulment and the original Findings 
of Fact, through the work of Mr. Hanson. The Defendant goes on to 
argue that it is "undisputed that Judge Conder never signed the 
final Decree of Annulment because it was never submitted for his 
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review." (Appellant's Brief at p. 13) . The pleadings filed by the 
Plaintiff and the evidence presented show that this statement is 
inaccurate. Mr. Hanson filed an affidavit with the court in which 
he states "As the Plaintiff's Attorney of record I prepared the 
Decree of Annulment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
as required by the Court and to forward them to the Court for 
entry." (R. 138). 
The Plaintiff has supported her position that her attorney had 
properly followed through with the court's order from the 1983 
trial. The Defendant's contention that good cause does not exist 
is unsupported by the facts and the pleadings prepared in this 
case. The Trial Court found "good cause" and this finding should 
be upheld by this Court. 
The Defendant next argues that even if there is good cause for 
entering the Decree and the Findings nunc pro tunc the documents 
are not consistent with the 1983 ruling. This argument is moot. 
The defendant had the opportunity to object to the Decree and the 
Findings as they were prepared. The Decree and Findings were 
mailed to the Defendant's attorney of record David Brown on the 
10th day of May, 1994. Judge Medley entered the Decree and signed 
the Findings on the 3rd day of June, 1994. The Defendant had 
notice and ample opportunity to object to the form of the Decree 
and the Findings. The Defendant, either by counsel or personally, 
did not object to the form when the documents were entered. The 
Defendant should not now be heard to complain that the documents 
are inaccurate even though he did not object to the documents when 
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they were presented to him. This Court should not entertain this 
issue when it was not raised at the trial court level where it 
could have been properly addressed. 
Next, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff willfully 
disobeyed Judge Conderfs order from the 1983 trial. The Defendant 
argues that the facts are undisputed that the Plaintiff "knowingly, 
intentionally, and wrongfully" disobeyed the order of the Trial 
Court. (Appellantfs Brief p. 14 and 15). This contention is 
against the factual findings of Judge Medley made at the conclusion 
of the hearing on Defendant!s Order to Show Cause. Judge Medley 
specifically stated that "this Court is far from persuaded by the 
evidence that the plaintiff in this case intentionally and 
willfully attempted to disregard Judge Conder's ruling in this 
particular case." (R. 261, emphasis added). 
The Defendant has the responsibility of showing this Court 
that the Trial Court's finding is clearly wrong and against the 
weight of the evidence. The Defendant must marshall "all evidence 
relevant to the finding and then shows the finding to be clearly 
erroneous." Barber v. Barber. 792 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1990). 
Defendant does not provide this Court with any evidence, either in 
the record or now, which even hints that Judge Medley1s finding 
would be an abuse of discretion. This Court must therefore presume 
that Judge Medley's findings are correct and in accord with the 
weight of the evidence as presented to the Court at the hearing. 
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B. The Plaintiff's personal and first-hand knowledge 
of Judge Conder's ruling in 1983 does NOT give the 
Plaintiff actual knowledge and notice of the 
Defendant's preparation and filing of a proposed 
Decree of Annulment and proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, 
The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff received "fair and 
sufficient notice, was given ample opportunity to be heard, and to 
prepare for the defense of her person, position and property. 
Wilma is therefore charged with 'actual' notice of that 
proceeding's judgment and there is no due process violation based 
upon the entry of that judgment without notice in 1993." 
(Appellant's brief p. 16 and 17). The Defendant relies upon a 
Montana State Supreme Court decision to say that the Plaintiff had 
constructive notice simply because she is a party to the case. 
This argument is clearly against the Rules of Civil Procedure 
of the State of Utah. Rule 58A(d) requires a party to give "prompt 
notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and 
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the 
court." The Defendant did not give the Plaintiff any notice that 
he had prepared a proposed Decree and proposed Findings when he 
filed and had the Court enter the documents. The Defendant then 
prepared a proposed Amended Decree and Amended Findings. Again, 
the Defendant did not provide the Plaintiff with notice of the 
filing and the entry of these pleadings or decree. 
The Plaintiff was not allowed an opportunity to be heard by 
the Court when the documents were entered since she did not have 
any knowledge of the Defendant's actions. The Plaintiff rights to 
defend and to be heard were violated by the Defendant's failure to 
-16-
follow the Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules were adopted so 
that parties are given notice of the status of the case. Wilma 
believed that Mr. Hanson had prepared and filed the Decree of 
Annulment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law some ten 
(10) years earlier. Both of the parties acted under the belief 
that if the Decree had been entered for those ten years. The 
Plaintiff cannot be charged with "actual knowledge" of the 
Defendant's actions ten years after the fact. The Trial Court 
properly set aside the Decree of Annulment and the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law which had been entered without notice to the 
Plaintiff. Judge Medley found that the Plaintiff did not have 
actual knowledge of the entry of the Decree and the Findings the 
Defendant filed with the court. (R. 183) . Again, if the Defendant 
wants this Court to overturn the findings of the Trial Court he 
must marshall all the evidence that shows the Trial Court's factual 
error. The Defendant makes an assertion that the Trial Court was 
wrong but does not offer any new evidence or any evidence from the 
record to show the findings are clearly wrong. 
Judge Medley found the Defendant had violated the Plaintiff's 
due process rights by not giving the Plaintiff notice of the filing 
and entry of the Decree and Findings and the Amended Decree and 
Amended Findings. Judge Medley acted properly by setting aside the 
Decree and the Findings. 
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C. The Defendant's argument that the Lower Court 
erroneously set aside the 1993 Amended Decree of Annulment 
is moot in light of the Findings of the lower Court. 
The Defendant argues that the Amended Decree and Amended 
findings should not have been set aside unless they are clearly 
erroneous. While this argument would be proper in most cases it is 
moot in this case. Judge Medley found that a due process violation 
occurred and set aside the Amended Decree and Amended Findings 
because of this violation. The Defendant's argument is without 
merit based upon the facts of the case and the specific finding of 
Judge Medley. 
D. Judge Medley applied the equitable doctrine of 
Laches to both parties claimsf 
Judge Medley, at the conclusion of the 1994 evidentiary 
hearing on the Defendant's Order to Show Cause, found that the 
Defendant AND the Plaintiff had waited too long in bringing their 
actions before the Court. He therefore barred each party's claims 
due to the parties' failure to act when they properly should have 
acted. 
The Defendant waited for ten (10) years before he tried to 
collect on the judgment. Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-22 
specifically states that a person has eight years to bring an 
action upon a judgment or decree. The Defendant brought an action 
to enforce the judgment ten (10) years after the judgment was 
entered by Judge Conder. Judge Medley found that Judge Conder had 
made findings and entered a judgment at the 1983 trial. As part of 
the 1994 hearing, Judge Medley also found that the Defendant made 
an unbelievable witness. 
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The Defendant should have brought an action within the 
specified time limit if he wanted to collect on the judgment. He 
did not and the Defendant cannot and should not be heard to 
complain due to his failure to act when he should have acted. 
Neither party should be allowed ten (10) years to prepare pleadings 
which hey want to have enforced. 
Judge Medley also found the Plaintiff was barred from her 
counterclaim to the Order to Show Cause because she had waited for 
too long to bring the counterclaim. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court acted properly when it entered the Decree of 
Annulment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law nunc pro 
tunc. The Court found that Judge Conder had made findings about 
the issues presented by the Defendant in his Order to Show Cause. 
If the Defendant had wanted to collect on the judgment of Judge 
Conder he knew where the courthouse was to check to make sure the 
Decree had been entered. The Defendant also had an attorney he 
could have checked with to determine if the Decree had been 
entered. However, the Defendant did nothing for ten (10) years. 
When the Defendant acted he did so without notice to the 
Plaintiff. The Defendants actions violated the Plaintiff!s rights 
to be heard and to defend herself before the court. Judge Medley 
found that the Plaintiff had not been given notice and he properly 
set aside the Amended Decree and Amended Findings which were filed 
by the Defendant. 
-19-
The Court did not make any factual errors or legal errors in 
the entry of the Decree of Annulment nunc pro tunc and the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law nunc pro tunc. It is the 
Defendant's responsibility to marshall the evidence to support the 
contentions of the Trial Court's errors. The Defendant has failed 
to present any new evidence or show from the record any errors the 
Trial Court committed. 
The Trial Court' s Findings of Fact should be sustained by this 
Court. The Conclusions of Law by the Trial Court should be 
reviewed and found to be correct in accordance with the findings of 
the Trial Court. The appeal of the Defendant should therefore be 
dismissed. 
DATED this l7Hf day of April, 1995. 
^ ^ ,&&<&T~ 
w T ^ Douglas P.' Hoyt/ 
./ Attorney £&ry Appellee/Plaintiff Attorney for Appellee/Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Appellee's Brief to the following: 
Gary L. Bell 
124 South 400 East, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
by placing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
this /7fh day of April, 1995. 
^ t ^ ^ ^ ^J^jf'—-
BUGG-APP.BRF 
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STATS OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT IAKE ) as. 
X, Hal-M. Walton, do hereby cer t i fy that I am 
a cert i f ied Shorthand Reporter of the State of Utah;that on 
April 19, 1983 I appeared before the above-named Court and 
reported in Stenotype the order herein attached consisting 
of ten pages. That the same i s a true and correct rendition 
of my shorthanc**notes as transcribed by me. 
& i C f£ 
H.M. Walton C.S.R. 
Dated: March 21st, 1992 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATEnQFrtUTAH i OOOOQOQOOOOOOOO 
2 
WILMA R. BUGGER, 
3 I P l a i n t i f f , 
4 D-81-4371 
5 v . 
6 I : J U D G E ' S_ O R D E R 
7 I CHARLES B. BUGGER, 
Defendant. 
8 ' 
10 BE IT REMEMBERED, t h a t t h e above -capt ioned c a u s e of 
H a c t i o n came on r e g u l a r l y for h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e HONORABLE 
12 DEAN E". CONDER, one df t h e Judges o f t h e above-named Court on 
13 A p r i l 1 9 t h , 1983 . 
14 
15 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
1 6 J For t h e P l a i n t i f f : MR. KENN M.HANSEN 
At torney At Law , 
740 E. 3900 South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utat 
For t h e Defendant: MR. HORACE J . KNOWLTON 
Attorney At Law 2 14 Tenth Avenue 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Uta i 
1 THE COURT: It's the Judgement of this Court that 
2 the parties be granted a Decree of Anullment;and I think that] 
3 the law provides that whatever property has been acquired by 
4 the parties during their marriage should be equally divided 
5 between them. And it's my feeling that marriage is a partned 
6 -shiprand as much as possible should share in the profits an4 
7 share in the losses. 
8 I find that there is an equity in the home of thirty-J-
9 three-thousand-six hundred-thirty dollars. Going to award 
10 the home to the Plaintiff herein* 
11 I find that there is an equity in the Duchesne lot oif 
12 five-hundred-fifty dollars, because that's what you say you 
13 took it in for;and I'll award that to you so that you can 
14 find it and have whatever value there is for thatr 
15 MR* BUGGER:- If you can find it. 
16 THE COURT: —in the mobile trailer home, I find 
17 that there is a present value equity of $7000;and going to 
18 award that to the Defendant* Furniture and fixtures I'll 
19 award to the Plaintiff. The siding company, sir, whatever 
20 there was there you say is yours;so you're obligated for 
21 whatever obligations there are arising out of it and I'll 
22 award to you whatever tools of the trade and equipment there 
23 may be that were yours for use;and you're entitled to get 
24 them; if the Plaintiff has any of them, order that she turn 
25 them over to the Defendant, including the tool press, bench 
1 saw, ladder and wheel barrow. 
2 Since apparently neither side "is certain that there 
3 is a diamond ring, it's whereabouts, not going to make any 
4 specific order on that unless it's determined where it is. I 
5 don't know where it is* 1975 Cadillac going to award to the 
6 Plaintiff/ and as I figure it, that gives to the Plaintiff in 
7 assets, $38,630. 
8 Since the Defendant has sold the truck, the Plymouth, 
9 LeMans, I'll award him the proceeds of those sales;the.:thous-
10 -and dollars on the truck, the fifty dollars on the Plymouth 
11 fifty dollars on the LeMansrvalue of the tools at $1,700,and 
12 that comes to $10,350, including the mobile home and the Duch 
13 -esne lot. I think that the-obligation on the property of th 
14 marriage certainly ought to be shared up until the time the 
15 parties split up?and so 1 am going to order that the payment 
16 to Sears of $432 be split between the parties, Dr. Barnes is 
17 to be split* Don't have a figure on that. 
18 MR. HANSEN: Fifty dollars, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT;- Fifty dollars? All right. The mobill^  
20 home, the $1,500 paid by the Plaintiff on that, to be split 
21 between the parties. The $744 to be split between the parties 
22 And the IRS lien, because the only evidence I have before-me 
23 I is apparently those .were obligations incurred during the marr 
24 -iage when both of you are working?and I can't identify as 
25 being the obligation ol one person only. And so if I add 
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those f igures together , that leaves one item that I 
have not included h e r e ; I have some d i f f i c u l t y trying t o figure) 
out what i t is;and t h a t ' s the equity in the uniform r e a l 
e s t a t e contract . I t has nine years t o go, for 12 months, 
times $79. which means tha t there i s $8,532 yet t o be paid on 
t h a t . But that would have to be discounted t o i t ' s current 
v a l u e ; i n nine years, the in teres t would equal the pr inc ipa l . 
Going t o s e t the f igure on that of $6000;just having t o do i t 
a r b i t r a r i l y . If I put $6000 on that and award that t o the 
Defendant, the two p a r t i e s then come out approximately equal. 
Nineteen-thousand-three-huridred-fifteen do l lars t o the P la in-
t i f f ;n ineteen-thousand-eight e *» dol lars t o the Defendant. 
jAnd I think t h a t ' s as near as I can divide the a s s e t s . 
MR. HANSEN: One point, of c l a r i f i c a t i o n , Your 
Eonor. And now that I get your bottom figure he're;I am assum-J-
- ing then that the award of the residence t o the P l a i n t i f f 
would incorporate the underlying f i r s t and second mortgage 
o b l i g a t i o n thereunder. 
THE COURT: I have taken, using $33;630 and value 
of the property and $5000 for the Cadil lac, makes a t o t a l of 
thixty-eight-thousand-six-hundred-thirty d o l l a r s . I r e a l l y 
g i v e no value t o furniture and f i x t u r e s , because they 're 
va luable t o tie person that has them, but can't s e l l them for 
f i f t y bucks, a hundred bucks, whatever. 
MR. HANSEN: It would be, Your Honor, for my own 
1 c l a r i f i c a t i o n then that the award of the rea property, | 
2 t h a t ' s the Kearns property t o the P l a i n t i f f is' sub A C t i;o her! 
3 assuming both underlying o b l i g a t i o n s . 
4 THE COURT: Yes, t h a t ' s r i g h t . C a d i l l a c , fyrnit-
5 -ure and f ix tures in the home would only be $6000. $19*315, 
6 i f i d iv ide that by two, g ive him the Duchesne l o t , mobile 
1 home and the truck, and the Plymouth, LeMans, the t o o l s , u n i -
8 -form r e a l e s ta te contract and one half the debts that have 
9 been paid by her;and that comes out to h i s share $19,018. I 
10 think that difference i s too miniscule t o bo ther w i th . 
11 MR. BUGGER: How am I goin' t o c o l l e c t on the 
12 t o o l s when there a i n ' t any? They -sold 'em a l l . 
13 THE COURT: Sorry, can' t answer t h a t quest ion . 
14 Didn't create t h i s s i t u a t i o n . Doing
 tthe bes t I can with what 
15 I have g o t . 
16 MR KNCWLTON: Your Honor h a s a w a r d e d , a s I under 
"17 - s tand , the home out at Kearns together with the furniture 
IS there contained, t o the P la int i f f ;and that , as I heard Your 
!9 Honor, was approximately $38,000 
20 THE COURT: Uh-huh and the C a d i l l a c . 
21 MR. KNCWLTON: That would be $43 ,000 . 
22 THE COURT: No , $ 3 3 , 6 3 5 f o r t h e home, $ 5 0 0 0 f o r 
23 the Cadi l lac makes $38,630. 
24 MR. KNOWLTCN: My question i s , you sa id $19,000 
25 t o the one;$19,000 t o the other . How can we g e t $38,000 out 
' of $19,000 i t seems to me that under Your Honor's rule] 
2
 THE COURT: Wait a minute, you:ure r i g h t . You're 
3 r i g h t . You're r i g h t . Wait a minute;got t o make another ca l f 
4
 - cu lat ion here. You're r i g h t . I now come up with $19,018 
5
 that he g e t s . And a s s e t s , she gets t h i r t y - e i g h t . So I 've 
6
 got t o subtract the d i f ference between those two. Yes, he h^s 
7
 another $4,311 in equi ty in the value of the home. 
8 What I am doing i s taking $38,630 as the d i s t r i b u t - j 
9 - ion t o Mrs. whatever—the d i s tr ibut ion t o the Defendant. I | 
10 come out with $19 ,018 . 
11 MR. KNOWLTQN: Yes, s i r . 
12 THE COURT: And that includes ha l f of the b i l l s 
13 that were incurred a f t er the separation, except for the mort] 
14 -gage payments;I think that inures to her b e n e f i t because 
15 she has l ived in the home during that time;and so I add thosfe 
16 together and I come out with $19,018;and for him. And $38,6p0 
17 i f i subtract the $19,000 from the $38,630, that leaves me 
18 eight-thousand-six-hundred-seventy -two d o l l a r s more that 
19 she ' s ge t t ing than h e . And i f you d iv ide that between them, 
20 that would be $4,311 t o him t o even out . So they come out 
21 even. You follow me? 
22 MR. KN0WLTON: I don't b e l i e v e I do, Your Honor. 
23 Thirty-eight-thousand would be the equi ty that she would be 
24 rece iv ing . 
25 THE COURT: That's r i g h t . 
1 I MR. KNOWLTON: And the $19,000 from $38,000 i s 
2 THE COURT: Maybe my f igures are wrong* Didn't 
3 use my ca lcu lator on that one. If I don't use my ca l cu la tor 
4 I am in t rouble . 
5 MR. KNOWLTON: Di f ference would be 17 ,000 . Half 
6 of 17,000. 
7 THE COURT: 19,652, the difference, so I am in 
8 error. $19,652 difference. Divide that by two and that 
9 means $9,826 equity in the home that the Defendant should 
10 have. 
H Now, Mr. Hansen, have you followed my figures, I 
12 bope? 
13 MR.HANSEN: Well, Your Honor, I think so. If I 
14 can recap concerning the Plaintiffs'' position I have got. 
15 The Defendant's position we have taken $550 equity on the 
1g Duchesne lot. 
17 THE COURT: Give them to you. Duchesne lot, $550j 
18 mobile home, $7000, truck that was sold, $1000, '48 Plymouth 
19 fifty dollars, '65 LeMans, $50. tools, $i;700r balance on un-\ 
20 -iform real estate contract, $6000. Trying to take my best 
21 guestimate of what that would be. 
22 MR. HANSEN: 615350. 
23 THE COURT: She has paid in obligations the IRS, 
24 $2650, $423 to somebody—I don't remember who it is, $1,500, 
25 $744, which comes out to $5,367 and charge him with half of 
that is $26,83.50. So I add to his the 2683. 
2
 MR. HANSEN: Ok. Come within a few dollars o"f 
3
 that that arrives at his equity figure then,. 
4
 THE COURT: Ok. 
5
 MR. HANSEN: From the Plaintiff $38,630, Your 
6
 Honor, that incorporates or encompasses the half of the bills 
7
 she has paid;I assumed, in other words the other 2683 that is 
8
 in there. 
9
 THE COURT: Taking the current balance on the 
1° equi ty of the p lace . She has the advantage of l i v i n g there 
" I for whatever i t i s , I considered that comparable to the rent}-
- t i n g of the place during the same period a t ime . A l l r i g h t . 
Now, that means tha t on t h i s kind of a division she 
would s t i l l ewe him $9,620 as a l i e n on the home. 
MR. KN0WLTON: To make i t e q u i t a b l e . Your Honor, 
so tha t Your Honor w i l l understand our th inking , I think we 
would be w i l l i n g t o o f f e r her the switch and g ive her $10,000 
from the s a l e of the home, t h a t i s . 
MR. HANSEN: I don.'t know that t h a t 
MR. MIOWLTON: Give her everything that they've 
of fered her and $10,000 for the s a l e of the home. 
THE COURT: Well , you can work t h a t out any way 
you want. But my c a l c u l a t i o n s have gone as far as I can r ight 
now. Now, I think t h a t wi th the residence and the home t h a t ' s 
there, there ought to be a reasonable period to try to s e l l i t 
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or pay the Defendant his equity. How much time do 
2 you think that would be, Mr. Hans en? 
3 MR. KNOWLTON: Thirty days. 
4 THE COURT: Oh no. Spring. Mr. Hansen? 
5 MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, if I can have just a 
6 moment to digest a little bit of this and consult with my cli 
7 -ent, if I may? 
8 THE COURT: Give you thirty seconds. 
9 MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, we would ask the Court 
10 that under the circumstances that we haverwe're in April,now 
11 that is the 4th month;that we have 180 days to come up with 
12 the money to satisfy that lien. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Knowlton, what would you suggest? 
14 MR. KNOWLTON: Your Honor, calling the attention 
15 of the Court to the fact that this is April, we're about to g 
16 into May. In our area the selling time is May and October. 
17 We think, Your Hqnor, sixty days would be just right 
18 And we think Your Honor should give some thought to whether ojf 
19 not there shouldn't be any 
20 THE COURT: Ok. Here is what I am going to do. 
21 I am going to order that the Plaintiff have six months in 
22 which to sell and pay to the Defendant the $9,826. The reasofi 
23 I am doing it that way is because I am giving the Defendant 
24 the income off from the uniform real estate contract;and that 
25 if it is not sold within six months or the Defendant is paid 
out and I don't care whether you s e l l i t or pay him the] 
$9 ,826; that the ammount w i l l then accrue i n t e r e s t a t the 
l e g a l r a t e , which i s now 12 %. And the Court w i l l order the] 
property l i s t e d for sa le by mult ip le l i s t i n g r e a l e s t a t e 
agency and sold for the best p r i c e . And that a f t er tha t 
date , s i x months from t h e date I s ign the Order on t h i s , i t 
would accrue i n t e r e s t a t the ra te of the l ega l r a t e of inter] 
- e s t . Not going t o award attorneys f e e s . Don't think they 
are c a l l e d for under the Anullment S ta tu te . Ok. Good luck 
t o yoi ahe Court w i l l be in r e c e s s . 
(WHEREUPON .tnis nearing was concluded.) 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
W. KEVIN JACKSON (1640) 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2379 
Telephone: (801) 531-6600 
Facsimile: (801) 521-3731 
C* *?"* ! Uk5 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
WILMA R. BUGGER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES B. BUGGER 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KENN M. HANSON, 
ESQ. 
Case No. D81-4371 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Commissioner Judith Atherton 
oooOooo 
STATE OF ARIZONA ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF MOHAVE ) 
Affiant first being duly sworn upon oath disposes and says as 
follows: 
1. I was the Attorney of Record in the above entitled case 
during the pendency of the Complaint for Divorce and the Complaint 
for Annulment entered in the above entitled case. 
2. I represened the Plaintiff, Wilma R. Bugger in the above 
entitled case on the issures raised in the various pleadings. 
3. I am familiar with the records and the pleadings in this 
case as filed with the Clerk of the Court. 
4. I have personal knowledge concerning the facts setforth 
in this affidavit and the facts of the case during the time that I 
was the Attorney for the Plaintiff, Wilma R. Bugger. 
00137 
5. If I am called to testify at trial my testimony would be 
as setforth herein. 
6. That on or shortly after the 19th day of April, 1983, the 
above entitled Court entered a Decree of Annulment by and between 
the parties which became final and which has not been subjuct to 
any appeal by any party. 
7. As the Plaintiff's Attorney of record I prepared the 
Decree of Annulment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
as required by the Court and to forward them to the Court for 
entry. 
8. It was, and still is, my practice to timely prepare all 
Orders of the Court which I am required to prepare. 
9. It was, and still is, my practice to submit to the Court 
all Orders when I have completed the Order and have had the 
opposing Counsel approve the Order as to form. 
10. It was, and still is, my practice to follow up on any 
matter I submit for entry to the Court to ensure that the Court 
enters said Decree. 
11. That to the best of my knowledge I followed my usual 
business custom and practice and submitted the Decree of Annulment 
and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. A copy of each is 
attached as Exhibit "A" and "B" and incorporated by this reference. 
12. That had I known or reason to believe that the Decree of 
Annulment had not been entered by the Court after submission I 
would have again resubmitted the Decree of Annulment to be certain 
that the Decree was properly entered. 
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Further Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this // day of'March, 19 94 
Kenn M. Ha 
Attorney 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF ARIZONA 
COUNTY OF MOHAVE 
ss. 
) 
I, the undersigned individual being first duly sworn under 
oath, deposes and says that: 
I am the person described in the attached document, and have 
read said document in its entirety. 
That the allegations made in said document are, to the best of 
my knowledge and belief, true and accurate representations, 
allegations and statements. 
That the information supplied in said document is done so in 
good faith and is based on personal knowledge or belief. 
Dated this '' day of-March, 1994. 
1994 
UNDERSIGN! 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me on this //<£$£ day of 
efa^tftrt* 
Notary Public 
Residing at: ^CU^Az^ 
My commission expires: 
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OPHOM. SEAL 
VIRGINIA W.WELLONG 
Notay Pubic-Slate of Arizona 
MOHAVE COUNTY 
My C a m Expiree Jsn.7,1995 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document to the following: 
David W. Brown, Esq. 
Boston Building, Suite 1120 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
by placing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
this }2±L~ day of April, 1994. 
BUGGHATT.AFF 
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KENN M. HANSON of and for 
CONDER, HANSON, WANGSGARD & BULLEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILMA R. BUGGER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES B. BUGGER, 
Defendant. 
> DECREE OF ANNULMENT 
i Civil No. D-81-4371 
Trial on this matter came on for its regularly scheduled 
time on the 19th day of April/ 1983, before the Honorable Dean 
Conder, District Court Judge. Plaintiff appeared personally and 
through her attorney, Kenn M. Hanson; Defendant appeared personally 
and through his attorney, Horace Knowlton. The Court heard and 
considered the parties1 testimony as proffered by their attorneys 
and further considered the evidence, and being fully advised in 
the premises and good cause appearing thereonf the Court now 
makes and enters the following 
DECREE 
1. Defendant is granted a Decree of Annulment declaring 
the parties narriage void ab initio. 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
00141 
2. The real property located at 4098 W. 5500 Southf 
Kearns, Utah, is awarded to Plaintiff subject to Plaintiff assuming 
and paying the underlying 1st and 2nd mortgages thereon, and, 
further, subject to an equitable lien in favor of Defendant in 
the amount of $9,796.00. 
3. Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant the equitable 
lien as follows: 
a. Plaintiff shall have 18 0 days from entry of the 
Decree to pay to Defendant the amount of $9,796.00. 
b. In the event Plaintiff has not paid Defendant 
$9,796.00 upon the expiration of 180 days from the entry of the 
Decree, said amount of Defendant's lien shall accrue interest on 
the principal amount at the rate of 12% per annum until paid. 
c. Further, upon the expiration of 18 0 days from the 
entry of the Decree and in the event Plaintiff has not paid 
Defendant the amount of Defendant's lien, the above-referenced 
real property shall be listed for sale through a multiple listing 
agency and sold for the best price. 
4. Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate 
property the cabin lot located in Duchesne County, Utah, subject 
to any and all underlying obligations thereon. 
5. Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate 
property the 12f x 60' mobile home subject to any and all under-
lying obligations thereon. 
-2-
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6. Defendant is awarded as his sole arid separate 
property the proceeds of a\jJniform Real Estate Contract ^mounting 
to $79.11 per month until said payments terminate according to 
the terms and provisions of said contract. 
7. Plaintiff is awarded as her sole and separate 
property the fixtures, furniture and personalty located within 
the real property at 4098 West 5500 South, Kearns, Utah. 
8. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay, holding 
Plaintiff harmless from any liability thereon, the debts and 
obligations arising from Defendant's company known as B&B Siding 
Co., listed as follows: 
a. Century Finance 
b. Valley Bank & Trust */fr/Pp.^ ^jod-
c. VISA O-fA. 
9. - Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate 
property the proceeds from the sale or une following automobiles: 
a. The B&B Siding panel truck ki^k" M~ 
b. 1948 Plymouth automobile ^ ^ > ^ * 
c. 1965 LeMan's Pontiac automobile 
d. the Mercury automobile. im<2*lu^ 
10. Plaintiff is awarded as her sole and separate 
property the 1975 Cadillac automobile. $MM> ^JLot ^ 
11. Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate 
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property the tools of his trade that remain in Plaintiff's posses-
sion* 
12, Defendant is ordered to pay and assume one-half 
of the bills owing to: 
a* Sears 3 p^-
b. Dr. Regal 
c. payments on the mobile home *^&c.# 
d. personal loan 
e. IRS lien ^-fJ.-
13. Each party is ordered to assume and pay their 
respective attorney's fees and costs in maintaining this action. 
DATED this )# day of (XryUcS , 1983. 
BY THE COURT: 
/DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
HORACE KNOWLTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
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KENN M. HANSON of and for 
CONDER, HANSON, WANGSGARD & BULLEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILMA R. BUGGER, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
CHARLES B. BUGGER, 
Defendant. 
i FINDINGS OF FACT 
i and 
i CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. D-81-4371 
Trial on this matter came on for its regularly scheduled 
time on the 19th day of April, 1983/ before the Honorable Dean 
Conder, District Court Judge. Plaintiff appeared personally and 
through her attorney, Kenn M* Hanson; Defendant appeared personally 
and through his attorney, Horace Knowlton. The Court heard and 
considered the parties1 testimony as proffered by their attorneys 
and further considered the evidencef and being fully advised in 
the premises and good cause appearing thereon, the Court now 
makes and enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both Plaintiff and Defendant are now and for at 
least three (3) months immediately before the filing of this 
* PLAINTIFFS 
I EXHIBIT 
I B 
nm AK 
action have been residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. The parties were married on June 10, 1946, in Las 
Vegas, Nevada. However, at that time of said marriage Plaintiff's 
interlocutory period from a prior divorce had not expired rendering 
the marriage ceremony to Defendant void. 
3. During the course of the parties' relationship, 7 
six (R) children were born as issue, all of whom have attained 
majority. 
4. During the course of their relationship the parties 
acquired real property situat^ at 4098 West 5500 South, Kearns, 
Utah, consisting of a house and lot. The fair market value of 
said real property is $47,000.00. 
There exists an underlying 1st mortgage on said 
real property in the amount of $5,633.13; there exists an 
underlying 2nd mortgage on said real property in the amount of 
$8,236.10. 
Based thereon, total present equity in said real 
property amounts to $33,630.77. 
5. During the course of the parties' relationship, the 
parties acquired a cabin lot located in Duchesne County, Utah. 
The fair market value of said real property is $550.00. 
6. During the course of the parties' relationship, the 
parties acquired a 12' x 60' mobile home. The fair market value 
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of said mobile home is $-?-rO00.00. 
7. During their relationship the parties acquired 
certain vehicles described as follows with corresponding values: 
a. 1975 Cadillac automobile $ 5,000.00 
b. Mercury automobile 100.00 
c. Panel truck 1,000.00 
d. 1948 Plymouth 50.00 
e. 1965 Pontiac 50.00 
8. During the course of the relationship, the parties 
acquired the proceeds of a Uniform Real Estate Contract on a 
principal sum of $7,800.00 at 9% interest per annum for 15 years 
paying $79.11 per month. Said contract has 9 years on its terms 
and the present value of said note is $6,000.00. *?/od< 
9. During the course of the relationship, the Defendant 
acquired tools of his trade which have a present value of $1,700.00. fla 
10* During the course of the relationship, the parties 
incurred various obligations set forth below with corresponding 
balances which have been paid by Plaintiff: 
a. Sears $ 423.00 
b. Dr. Regal 50.00 ? 
c. Mobile Home 1,500.00 £pd J^pe^ 
d. Credit Union 744.00 /ti/ld-
e. IRS lien 2,650.00 Uirf't /jui^fM 0)Tt$ 
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11. During the course of the relationship, the Defendant 
incurred certain debts in the name of his businesf B&B Siding, as 
follows: 
a. Century Finance*' Company; 
b. Valley Bank & Trust; and /0f40.4£ tfui*. &O,\A . 
c. VISA. £? />d. 
12. It is fair and reasonable that the real property 
located at 4098 W. 5500 Southf Kearns, Utah, be awarded to 
Plaintiff subject to Plaintiff assuming and paying the underlying 
1st and 2nd mortgages thereon, and, further, subject to an 
equitable lien in favor of Defendant in the amount of $9,796.00. 
13. It is fair and reasonable that Plaintiff pay to 
Defendant the equitable lien as follows: 
a. Plaintiff shall have 180 days from entry of the 
Decree to pay to Defendant the amount of $9,796.00. 
b. In the event Plaintiff has not paid Defendant 
$9/796.00 upon the expiration of 180 days from the entry of the 
Decree, said amount of Defendant's lien shall accrue interest on 
the principal amount at the rate of 12% per annum until paid. 
c. Further, upon the expiration of 180 days from the 
entry of the Decree and in the event Plaintiff has not paid 
Defendant the amount of Defendant's lien, the above-referenced 
real property shall be listed for sale through a multiple listing 
agency and sold for the best price. 
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14. It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be awarded 
as his sole and separate property the cabin lot located in Duchesne 
County, Utah, subject to any and all underlying obligations 
thereon, 
15. It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be awarded 
as his sole and separate property the 12' x 60' mobile home 
subject to any and all underlying obligations thereon. 
16. It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be awarded 
as his sole and separate property the proceeds of a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract amounting to $79.11 per month until said payments/^<fo^ 
terminate according to the terms and provisions of said contract. 
17. It is fair and reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded 
as her sole and separate property the fixtures, furniture and 
personalty located within the real property at 4098 West 5500 
South, Reams, Utah. 
18. It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be ordered 
to assume and pay, holding Plaintiff harmless from any liability 
thereon, the debts and obligations arising from Defendant's 
company known as B&B Siding Co., listed as follows: 
a. Century Finance 
b. Valley Bank & Trust ^3 W * 
c. VISA *3~fzd* 
19. It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be awarded 
00H9 
as his sole and separate property the proceeds from the sale of 
the following automobiles: 
/a. The B&B Siding panel truck 
b. 1948 Plymouth automobile 
c. 1965 LeMan's Pontiac automobile 
the Mercury automobile. 
U^J^ 20. It is fair and reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded 
as her sole and separate property the 1975 Cadillac automobile. 
V ^ 21. It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be awarded 
his sole and separate property the tools of his trade that 
remain in Plaintiff's possession. 
22. It is fair and reasonable that Defendant be ordered 
to pay and assume one-half of the bills owing to: 
a. Sears ^ JpL 
b. Dr. Regal 7 
c. payments on the mobile home 
d. personal loan ^PjljL* 
e. IRS lien ^f^L^ 
23. It is fair and reasonable that each party be 
ordered to assume and pay their respective attorney's fees and 
costs in maintaining this action. 
WHEREFORE, the Court, having made and entered the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the following: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to and 
subject matter of this action. 
2. There exists grounds legally sufficient to grant a 
Decree of Annulment declaring said marriage to be void ab initio. 
3. There exists legally insufficient grounds to award 
attorney's fees to either party. 
4. The Decree of Annulment should be in conformance 
with the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED this Wl day of /fylt4/ , 1983, 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
HORACE KNOWLTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
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HOME: 
F a i r Market Value $ 4 7 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 
1 s t mortgage: $ 5 , 6 3 3 . 1 3 
2nd mortgage: $ 8 , 2 3 6 . 0 0 - 1 3 , 8 6 9 . 2 3 
TOTAL EQUITY: $ 3 3 , 6 3 0 . 7 7 
PLAINTIFF'S EQUITY: 
a . Real p r o p e r t y $ 3 3 , 6 3 0 . 0 0 
b . C a d i l l a c 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Plaintiff's GROSS equity: $ 38,630.00 
LESS Defendant's lien: 9,796.00 
PLAINTIFF'S NET EQUITY: $ 28,834.00 
DEFENDANT'S EQUITY: 
a. Duchesne property $ 550.00 
b. UREC 6,000.00 
c. Trailer 7,000.00 
d. 1/2 of debts 2,688.00 
e. Defendant's tools 1,700.00 
g. Car proceeds 1,100.00 
Defendant's GROSS equity: $ 19,038.00 
PLUS Defendant's lien: 9,796.00 
DEFENDANT'S TOTAL EQUITY $ 28,834.00 
COMPUTATION OF DEFENDANT'S LIEN: 
Plaintiff's GROSS equity: $ 38,630.00 
Less Defendant's GROSS equity: -19,038.00 
Difference $ 19,592.00 
$19,592.00 diyided by 2 = $9,796.00( Defendant's lien) 
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